





The “All Lives Matter” response: QUD‑shifting as epistemic 
injustice
Jessica Keiser1 
Received: 16 January 2021 / Accepted: 20 April 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Drawing on recent work in formal pragmatic theory, this paper shows that the 
manipulation of discourse structure—in particular, by way of shifting the Ques-
tion Under Discussion mid-discourse—can constitute an act of epistemic injustice. I 
argue that the “All Lives Matter” response to the “Black Lives Matter” slogan is one 
such case; this response shifts the Question Under Discussion governing the over-
arching discourse from Do Black lives matter? to Which lives matter? This manipu-
lation of the discourse structure systematically obscures the intended meaning of 
“Black lives matter” and disincentivizes future utterances of it.
Keywords Question-Under-Discussion · Formal pragmatics · Black lives matter · 
Epistemic injustice
1 Introduction
Linguistic exchanges are not haphazard affairs; rather, they are structured social 
interactions. One element of this structure can be modeled by what formal prag-
matic theorists call Questions Under Discussion (hereafter QUDs). According 
to Roberts (2012)—building on the work of Lewis (1969), Stalnaker (1978), and 
Carlson (1982)—each discourse is structured around a set of interlocking questions 
arranged in a hierarchy, which represent the goals of the conversation and strategies 
for achieving those goals; at any given moment in the conversation, the QUD is the 
question which represents the most immediate aim of the discourse. Conversational 
moves are actions performed by discourse participants in service of achieving the 
goals represented by the set of discourse questions. In addition to structuring dis-
course, QUDs constrain these conversational moves; Schoubye and Stokke (2016), 
for instance, argue that what is said by a particular utterance is a function of the 
QUD, and van Kuppevelt (1996), van Rooij and Schulz (2004), Zondervan et  al. 
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(2008), Benz and Salfner (2013) have shown that the QUD affects the interpretation 
of implicatures.
While linguistic theory has long been guided by the assumption that linguistic 
interaction is a fundamentally cooperative affair, recent work in the philosophy of 
language has highlighted myriad ways in which language may be used as a tool for 
the perpetuation of unjust social systems rather than the realization of shared goals.1 
Following Kidd et al. (2017), I’ll use the umbrella term epistemic injustice to refer 
to “those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, 
and participation in communicative practices.”2 Drawing on recent work in formal 
pragmatic theory, I show that the manipulation of discourse structure—in particular, 
by way of shifting the QUD—can constitute an act of epistemic injustice.
I argue that the “All Lives Matter” response to the “Black Lives Matter” slogan 
is one such case. Though it began as a tone-deaf expression of support for the BLM 
protest movement, the “All lives matter” response quickly morphed into an expres-
sion of opposition and proposed corrective to the slogan, “Black lives matter”.3 Here 
are just a few examples which illustrate the corrective/oppositive use of “All lives 
matter”: Protesters have made signs with the word “Black” in “Black lives matter” 
conspicuously crossed out and replaced with “all”,4 politicians such as Mike Pence 
have answered “All lives matter” in direct response to the question “Do Black lives 
matter?”,5 women taking down “Black lives matter” signs in Visalia, CA claimed 
that they had a problem with these signs “because all lives matter”,6 and a wedding 
photographer’s contract was cancelled after she posted a “Black lives matter” sign 
on her social media page. The explanation given by the couple was that they could 
not support someone “who does not believe that ALL lives matter”.7 As many have 
pointed out, “All lives matter” cannot coherently serve as a corrective to what is said 
by “Black lives matter”, given that the former entails the latter.8 Rather, it serves as 
a corrective to a perceived implicature of “Black lives matter”; namely, that only 
Black lives matter (what Anderson 2017 calls the exclusive reading). I argue below 
that this implicature only arises given the assumption that the QUD is Which lives 
matter? and that “All lives matter” is proposed as an alternative answer to that par-
ticular QUD. However, the QUD governing the context in which protesters assert 
“Black lives matter” is rather, Do Black lives matter? Thus, ALM activists are 
1 These observations regarding the adversarial nature of language—many of which emerged from Black 
feminist theory—are not particularly recent, but have only recently been incorporated into mainstream 
philosophy of language.
2 Kidd et al. (2017, p. 1).
3 Cf. Olasov (2016), Atkins (2019).
4 https:// www. daily mail. co. uk/ news/ artic le- 83941 39/ White- Lives- Matter- count er- prote ster- handc uffed- 
remov ed- police- Sydney- demon strat ion. html, https:// www. india. com/ enter tainm ent/ bolly wood- news- 
sara- ali- khan- says- all- lives- matter- inste ad- of- Black- lives- matter- and- twitt er- tells- exact ly- whats- wrong- 
with- her- post- 40491 42/.
5 https:// www. cnn. com/ 2020/ 06/ 19/ polit ics/ mike- pence- Black- lives- matter- all- lives- matter/ index. html.
6 https:// abc30. com/ Black- lives- matter- sign- visal ia- racist- video- el- diama nte- high- school/ 62690 74/
7 https:// www. insid er. com/ ohio- couple- cance ls- weddi ng- photo graph er- suppo rts- Black- lives- matter- 
2020-6.
8 See, e.g., Butler (2015), Anderson (2017).
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shifting the QUD midstream, a move that results in the misinterpretation of “Black 
lives matter” (what Anderson, 2017 calls illocutionary flipping) and disincentivizes 
future utterances of that phrase (what Dotson, 2011 calls testimonial smothering). 
This manipulation of the discourse structure by way of shifting the QUD constitutes 
epistemic injustice insofar as serves to perpetuate an oppressive status quo.
Before I begin, let me say a word about what I hope to contribute to the discus-
sion surrounding the “All lives matter” slogan, and to the literature on epistemic 
justice. I aim to offer a complete interpretive analysis neither of “Black lives matter” 
nor “All lives matter”, but rather to focus on one particular aspect of a nuanced and 
complex discourse. Nor do I offer social/political insights that are not present—in 
one form or another—in various academic papers, news articles, and social media 
posts which engage with this topic. The way in which I propose to contribute to this 
discussion is to draw on these insights and situate them within the framework of 
formal pragmatic theory. My hope is that this will serve to more sharply delineate 
one particular mechanism behind the epistemic injustice of the “All lives matter” 
response—namely, manipulation of the discourse structure by shifting the QUD—
and provide the theoretical resources to identify other instances of epistemic injus-
tice through the same mechanism.
2  How questions structure discourse
According to a popular semantic/pragmatic framework developed by Roberts 
(2012)—building on the work of Lewis (1969), Stalnaker (1978), and Carlson 
(1982)—discourses are structured around a set of interlocking questions represent-
ing conversational goals. Following a long philosophical tradition, Roberts assumes 
that conversation is fundamentally a cooperative affair aimed at gaining information 
about the world—thus, she claims, the overarching goal can be characterized as that 
of answering the Big Question: What is the way things are? This conception of the 
goal of linguistic exchange is highly idealized; conversations are often character-
ized by conflict, and aimed not at gaining information about the world, but rather at 
changing it—or preserving the status quo, as the case may be.9 Robert’s framework 
can nonetheless be helpful in understanding the discourse structure surrounding the 
“All lives matter” response, and I will adopt it (while rejecting the idealized back-
ground assumption) in what follows.
Whether or not the overarching goal of the conversation is shared, and whether or 
not it is aimed at figuring out what the world is like, our conversations are nonethe-
less structured and organized around goals, which can be represented by questions. 
Roberts notes that in each conversation there is usually a set of questions organ-
ized in a hierarchy, with some questions (“subquestions”) serving as strategies for 
9 Camp (2018) explores ways in which discourse modelling in the Stalnakerian tradition can be adjusted 
in order to accommodate conflict in conversation.
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answering others (“superquestions”).10 For instance, addressing the question Is it 
raining? might be a strategy for answering the question Should we go to the park 
today?, The QUD is the question which represents the most immediate aim of the 
discourse. Roberts suggests that we think of questions as arranged in a stack: once 
we answer the immediate question of what the weather is like outside, it will be 
replaced by the next question in the stack: Should we go to the park today? Since we 
have answered the question about the weather, we will now be in a better position to 
answer the question about the park, and so on.
Building on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), Roberts suggests that questions 
structure discourse by setting up a set of alternatives which partition the common 
ground into cells. The notion of common ground comes from Stalnaker (1978), and 
refers to the information that is mutually taken for granted by conversational par-
ticipants. The common ground is modelled as a set of possible worlds—the “live 
options” for ways the actual world is, as far as the conversational participants are 
concerned. Questions serve to partition the space of live possibilities into potential 
answers; e.g., Is it raining? partitions this space into a cell containing the set of 
worlds in which it is raining and a cell containing the set of worlds in which it is not. 
Assertions, or answers to questions, aim to eliminate live possibilities; if you assert, 
“It’s not raining”, then you’ve proposed to eliminate the cell containing worlds in 
which it is raining from the common ground, leaving only the set of words in which 
it is not raining as live possibilities.
There are two broad types of questions: polar questions (yes/no questions) and 
wh-questions (“which…”, “who…” “what…”, etc.). While polar questions like Is it 
raining? partition the set of lives possibilities into two cells (corresponding to yes/
no answers), wh-questions, such as Who wants to go to the park? may partition the 
set of live possibilities into various numbers of cells, depending on the context. On 
Roberts’ framework, the cells of Who wants to go to the park? are given by replace-
ments of “who” by appropriate elements of the domain of the context. (The elements 
of the domain appropriate to “who” will be people, those appropriate to “what” will 
be things, etc.) For instance, if you and I are the only people relevant to our conver-
sational goals, then the QUD Who wants to go to the park? will partition the set of 
possible worlds into those in which I want to go to the park, those in which you want 
to go to the park, and those in which both/none of us do. But it does not partition 
the space into worlds in which Boris Johnson wants to go to the park, because he is 
not included in the domain of the context—he is not relevant to our conversational 
goals. Thus, the way in which the QUD partitions worlds into cells will depend upon 
features of the context, including which people are taken to be conversationally rel-
evant—this will be taken up again in Sect. 4.
Answers to questions can be complete or partial. For instance. If the QUD is Who 
wants to go to the park? in a context which includes just you and me, a complete 
10 Superquestions entail subquestions, in the sense that a complete answer to the former yields a com-
plete answer to the latter. Often subquestioning strategies will rely on context as well: One question 
contextually entails another when an answer to the former plus the common ground entails a complete 
answer to the latter. See Roberts (2012, p. 12). (More on complete answers and common ground below.).
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answer will need to give a verdict on each of the resulting cells; that is, it needs to 
indicate whether or not you want to go to the park and whether I to go to the park. 
A partial answer is one which gives a verdict on some but not all of the cells. For 
instance, if in this context I assert “I want to go to the park”, I have given a partial 
answer to the QUD Who wants to go to the park? I’ve proposed to eliminate the cell 
in which I don’t want to go to the park, but I’ve left open whether you want to go to 
the park. Thus, I’ve not settled the QUD, but I’ve allowed us to make some headway 
by answering one of its subquestions. Conversationalists may give partial rather than 
complete answers for any number of reasons. Sometimes this is because they don’t 
know the full answer; in other cases, speakers may know the full answer but only 
offer a partial answer, thus implicating a full (or, at least, less partial) answer. We’ll 
take up the issue of implicature in the following section.
3  How the QUD constrains discourse moves
There are two main types of conversational moves that can be made in service 
of achieving conversational goals: asking questions and making assertions (i.e., 
answering questions). Both serve as strategies for answering the QUD. Assertions 
do so by providing a verdict on at least one of the cells given by the QUD’s partition 
on the common ground, while asking questions set up strategies for doing so. For 
instance, If the QUD is Should we go to the park today? I might ask Is it raining? In 
doing so, I am temporarily changing to QUD so that we will be better positioned to 
answer the original QUD: as we saw before, once we’ve answered what the weather 
is like, we can return to the question of whether we should go to the park and be bet-
ter positioned to answer it.
The QUD governing a discourse will constrain the sorts of conversational moves 
available to participants. Schoubye and Stokke (2016), for instance, argue that what 
is said by a particular utterance is a function of the current QUD. Defining the mini-
mal content of an utterance as the minimal content that can be compositionally 
derived from the meaning of its parts in a context, Schoubye and Stokke propose 
that what is said by an sentence in a context is the weakest answer to the QUD that 
entails the minimal content of that sentence.11 The constraint that what is said must 
entail the minimal content of the utterance preserves the connection to the literal 
meaning of the sentence, while the constraint that what is said be an answer to the 
QUD delivers intuitive predictions in the following types of cases:
With an utterance of “Tipper is ready”, the speaker will have said that Tipper is 
ready for dinner in a context where the QUD is Is Tipper ready for dinner?, while 
the speaker will have said that Tipper is ready for the interview in a context where 
the QUD is Is Tipper ready for the interview? Similarly, with an utterance of “I 
wrote my paper”, the speaker will have said she wrote her paper while waiting for 
her laundry yesterday in a context where the QUD is What did you do while waiting 
for your laundry yesterday?, while she would have said more simply that she wrote 
11 See Schoubye and Stokke (2016, p. 774).
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her paper yesterday in a context where the QUD is What did you do yesterday? 
While Grindrod and Borg (2019) have pushed back on the idea that the QUD frame-
work can “provide a model of how we arrive at semantically relevant content,” they 
concede its usefulness in determining discourse moves and communicated content.12 
For our purposes here, it is not important to evaluate the details of Schoubye and 
Stokke’s (2016) proposal or issues pertaining to the semantics/pragmatics divide; 
but their results lend strong support to the claim that the interpretation of discourse 
moves—at the pragmatic, if not the semantic level—is constrained by the QUD.
Further support for this claim comes from recent work in experimental pragmat-
ics. For instance, van Kuppevelt (1996), van Rooij and Schulz (2004), Zondervan 
et  al. (2008), Benz and Salfner (2013), show that interpretations of implicatures 
depend on the QUD. In experiments performed by Zondervan et  al. (2008), e.g. 
audiences evaluating an utterance of “some pizzas were delivered”, derived the 
implicature that not all pizzas were delivered in a context where the QUD was Were 
all pizzas delivered? but not in a context in which the QUD was Were some piz-
zas delivered? Such results show that Schoubye and Stokke’s constraint on what is 
said—namely, that it answers the QUD—applies to interpretation of implicatures 
as well. This can be explained by appeal to Grice’s maxim of quantity, which states 
that speakers should make their contribution as informative as is required (no more, 
no less) for current purposes of the exchange. If, as Roberts suggests, purpose of the 
conversation is to answer the QUD, it will be natural for audiences to reach for an 
implicature which fills in the remaining information when a speaker is in a position 
to give a complete answer but provides only a partial one. That is, they will look 
for a conversational contribution that provides the information required for the pur-
pose of the exchange. But if the literal content of her assertion provides a complete 
answer to the QUD, audiences will be less likely to derive an implicature because 
no more information is required—the speaker has already done her job. Thus, in a 
context where the QUD is Were all pizza’s delievered? audiences are more likely 
to derive the implicature that not all pizzas were delivered because “some pizzas 
were delivered” has supplied only a partial answer. The implicature that not all piz-
zas were delivered would provide the missing information. In contrast, in a context 
where the QUD is Were some pizzas delivered? an utterance of “some pizzas were 
delivered” has supplied a complete answer. In this context, the implicature would 
violate the maxim of quantity by providing more information than is demanded by 
the conversational goals, and thus is not likely to be derived.
We’ve just observed that whether an utterance provides a partial or complete 
answer—and as a result, whether it is reasonable to interpret the speaker as hav-
ing implicated additional information—depends on the QUD. We can apply this 
observation to utterances of the sentence “Black lives matter”. Whether or not such 
utterances provide a partial answer—thus raising the interpretive issue of an impli-
cature—depends on the QUD. The polar question Do Black lives matter? partitions 
the common ground into two cells; those in which Black lives matter, and those in 
which they don’t. An answer of “Black lives matter” provides a complete answer 
12 Grindrod and Borg (2019, p. 425).
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to this question by giving a ruling on each of these cells; it proposes to make the 
proposition that Black lives matter part of the common ground and rule out the pos-
sibility that they don’t, thus settling the question. In contrast, the wh-question Which 
lives matter? partitions the common ground into as many cells as there are types of 
lives in the domain. (I.e., cells corresponding to any relevant completion of “___ 
lives matter.”) The potential for the implicature that only Black lives matter—which, 
following Anderson (2017), I’ll call the exclusive reading—could reasonably arise 
only when the QUD is Which lives matter? but not when the QUD is Do Black lives 
matter? given that it serves as an answer to the former, but not the latter question. 
That is, only in a context in which Which lives matter? is the QUD—and the speaker 
is in a position to give a verdict on each of the cells but offers an affirmative ruling 
only on the cell pertaining to Black lives—could it be reasonable to interpret her as 
implicitly giving a negative ruling on the remaining cells.13
Similarly, the statement “All lives matter” could only reasonably serve as a cor-
rective to “Black lives matter” if both are offered as opposing answers to the ques-
tion Which lives matter? When the QUD is understood as Do Black lives matter? 
an utterance of “All lives matter” fails to provide an answer. While it may entail 
an answer given further assumptions about the speaker’s beliefs (i.e., that black 
lives are included in the domain of discourse), in this case it nonetheless violates 
the maxim of quantity by providing more information than is required for the pur-
pose of the exchange. Moreover, in such a case, the entailment would affirm rather 
than contradict the statement “Black lives matter”. Thus, in order to make sense of a 
speaker’s utterance of “All lives matter” as a relevant contribution offered in opposi-
tion to, or as a corrective to, the statement “Black lives matter”, we would need to 
read her as operating under the assumption that both statements were made under 
the QUD Which lives matter? In this case, she will have derived the exclusive read-
ing from “Black lives matter” and will be offering an answer which contradicts it.
Thus, I suggest that in order to explain the oppositional and corrective nature of 
the “All lives matter” response, we must assume that it both proports to answer the 
QUD Which lives matter? and interprets utterances of “Black lives matter” as prof-
fering a complete answer to that same QUD by implicating the exclusive reading. 
In the following section I’ll offer linguistic considerations that further support the 
claim that “All lives matter” responses purport to answer the QUD Which lives mat-
ter? but that utterances of “Black lives matter” purport to answer a different ques-
tion, namely Do Black lives matter? If this is correct, then ALM activists are manip-
ulating the discourse structure by shifting the QUD mid-discourse, which—I will go 
on to argue in Sect. 5—constitutes an act of epistemic injustice.
13 Olasov (2016) makes a very similar point in noting that “If the goal of our national political con-
versation were just to ask everyone to list exhaustively all the things that they think matter, then saying 
“Black Lives Matter” would implicate that only Black lives Matter. But of course that’s not the goal of 
our national conversation.” Again, I hope to build upon this general idea by situating it within a theoreti-
cal framework and providing linguistic support.
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4  Which QUD?
In the previous section I suggested that the slogans “Black lives matter” and “All 
lives matter” are proffered as answers to different QUDs. In this section I’ll offer 
linguistic support for this claim. As Roberts notes, QUDs are usually raised implic-
itly rather than explicitly within discourse, which makes selecting the right QUD for 
a given assertion an interpretive issue. Linguistic research has shown that there are 
at least two reliable cues for determining which QUD an assertion aims to answer: 
focus and context.14 In this section I’ll appeal to both in order to support the claims 
that the slogan “Black lives matter” purports to answer the question Do Black lives 
matter? while the response of “All lives matter” purports to answer the question 
Which lives matter?
Research has established that focus (intonation on a particular word or phrase) 
strongly correlates with certain types of questions. In particular, answers to wh-
questions tend to focus on the topic; i.e., an utterance will be felicitious only in the 
case that it is an answer to a question which is determined by replacing the focused 
element with an appropriate wh-expression. Consider the following sentence:
1. Xavier ate Swedish fish.
An utterance of (1) could be an answer to any of the following three questions:
2. What did Xavier eat?
3. Who ate Swedish fish?
4. Did Xavier eat Swedish fish?
As we have seen, what is ultimately communicated by an utterance of (1) depends 
on which question it aims to answer. In particular, it may give rise to exclusive read-
ing implicatures if the QUD is (2) or (3), for which it gives a partial answer—but not 
(4), for which it gives a complete answer. In the former cases, if it can be assumed 
that the speaker is in a position to give a ruling on each cell of the partition, she will 
likely be read as implicating that Xavier ate only Swedish fish as an answer to (2) 
and that only Xavier ate Swedish fish as an answer to (3). In contrast, if (4) is the 
QUD, an utterance of (1) will not generate a reading of an implicature because it 
provides a complete answer to that question. Given that the QUD is often implicit, 
audiences common rely on a speaker’s prosodic focus to determining which QUD 
they aim to address. Consider an utterance of the following sentence:
5. Xavier ate [Swedish  fish]f




Replacing the focused element “Swedish fish” with the appropriate wh-expression—
namely, “what”—gives us back (2), for which (5) is a felicitous answer. In contrast, 
it would be infelicitous as an answer to (3) or (4). The same pattern holds for:
6. [Xavier]f ate Swedish fish
Replacing the focused element “Xavier” with the appropriate wh-question—namely, 
“who”—delivers (3), the only QUD for which it is a felicitous answer. Finally, unfo-
cused (or sometimes called “broadly focused”) answers are felicitous as answers to 
polar questions, to which the entire statement corresponds:
7. [Xavier ate Swedish  fish]f
An utterance of (7) would be a felicitous answer to (4), but not to (2) or (3).
This data on focal patterning suggests that if “Black lives matter” were offered 
as an answer to the question Which lives matter? we should expect to observe focus 
on the word “Black”. This could take the form of vocal prosodic stress on that word, 
or—in written utterances such as protest signs, t-shirts, social media posts, etc.—
the word might be underlined, written in all caps, red lettering, or bold print. Pro-
test chants, however, tend not to include prosodic stress on the word “Black”. Nor, 
according to a google image search of protest signs, BLM merchandise, social media 
posts and memes, etc. does there tend to be focus on the word “Black” through the 
use of textual highlighting.15 This evidence provides support for the conclusion that 
utterances of “Black lives matter” are proffered as answer to the polar question Do 
Black lives matter? rather than the wh-question Which lives matter?.
Facts about the discourse context provide additional support for this claim. A 
QUD will tend not to be raised if it is already taken as common ground; otherwise 
it will introduce a redundant discourse goal. That is, it will raise an issue that has 
already been mutually taken to be settled by discourse participants. The discourse 
context surrounding the BLM movement is one in which it is taken as common 
ground—indeed platudinous—that all lives matter.16 Thus, the question Which lives 
matter? –at least insofar as the context of the domain is limited to human lives—
fails to introduce a live issue to be settled; the common ground already includes 
the answer to this question, namely that all lives matter. However, in spite of the 
mutual acceptance of this platitude, we are also located in a context in which Black 
people are systematically treated as if their lives are not valuable, even by those who 
willingly endorse the slogan “All lives matter”. This feature of the context raises 
the issue of whether Black lives are seen as an exception to this phrase by those 
who would endorse it with their words but not their actions (more on this below). 
Recall that common ground includes information that is mutually accepted by dis-
course participants and as such is not determined solely by linguistic contributions, 
but may also include mutually apparent facts. The discourse surrounding the BLM 
15 If anything, there is occasional focus on the word “lives” or the word “matter”.
16 Cf. Butler (2015).
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movement takes place in a context in which many discourse participants, as Butler 
(2015) notes, “embrace a “‘norm’” that effectively says “Black lives do not matter,” 
one that is built up over time, through daily practices, modes of address, through the 
organization of schools, work, prison, law, and media.” This context is one in which 
it is distinctly not yet common ground—that is, not mutually accepted by discourse 
participants—that Black lives matter. It is a context which in which a very particu-
lar question about the value of Black lives, rather than lives in general, is treated as 
unsettled: Do Black lives matter?17
Even companies like Apple and Google have picked up on the QUD governing 
the BLM discourse context. Both Siri and Google Assistant, for instance, have been 
programmed to answer the question “Do Black lives matter?” with “Black lives 
matter”.18 They direct their users to BlackLivesMatter.com for further information 
about the subject, indicating that they take the QUD behind the statement “Black 
lives matter” to be Do Black lives matter? Similarly, Tiktok users have developed 
a trend of asking the question “Do Black lives matter?” and listing the answers that 
they have been given.19 BLM supporters seeking to narrow or broaden the scope of 
the conversation introduce variations on Do Black lives matter? rather than Which 
lives matter?, asking questions such as: Do Black lives matter in Iowa? Do Black 
lives matter to Democrats? Do Black lives matter in bilingual education?20 In all of 
these cases, BLM supporters have implicitly or explicitly picked up on the fact that 
the QUD governing the assertion of “Black lives matter” by BLM protesters is the 
polar question Do Black lives matter? and that the answer it offers is a resounding 
affirmative.
The same considerations concerning focus and context demonstrate that ALM 
protestors aim to answer a different question, namely, Which lives matter? Recall 
that an utterance will be felicitious only in the case that it is an answer to a ques-
tion which is determined by replacing the focused element with an appropriate 
wh-expression. Focus on the word “all” in “All lives matter”, then, would strongly 
indicate that this phrase is being offered as an answer to Which lives matter? Pho-
tos from protests and a scroll through ALM merchandise indeed indicates that the 
word “all” is frequently focused through underlining, bold print, red print, or other 
means.21 A Facebook group page associated with the ALM movement places focus 
17 Cf. Halstead (2016).
18 https:// www. cnbc. com/ 2020/ 06/ 09/ apple- siri- google- assis tant- new- respo nse- to- do- Black- lives- matter. 
html.
19 Ibid.
20 https:// www. thena tion. com/ artic le/ socie ty/ Black- lives- matter- iowa/, https:// www. usato day. com/ story/ 
opini on/ 2020/ 06/ 27/ Black- lives- matter- but- only- somet imes- column/ 32649 46001/, https:// educa tiona lling 
uist. wordp ress. com/ 2016/ 09/ 11/ do- Black- lives- matter- in- bilin gual- educa tion/.
21 https:// en. wikip edia. org/ wiki/ All_ Lives_ Matter, https:// www. houst onchr onicle. com/ local/ gray- matte 
rs/ artic le/ The- inher ent- viole nce- of- All- Lives- Matter- 66568 16. php, https:// third railn ews. com/ 2015/ 09/ 
30/ Black lives matter- name/, https:// thepi nnacl eshop. com/ produ cts/ all- lives- matter- mens- tee? varia nt= 
32511 85529 6597& curre ncy= USD& utm_ medium= produ ct_ sync& utm_ source= googl e& utm_ conte nt= 
sag_ organ ic& utm_ campa ign= sag_ organ ic, https:// teesp ring. com/ shop/ allli ves- matter- shirt_ copy_2? 
show_ curre ncy= USD& utm_ source= googl e& utm_ medium= cpc& utm_ campa ign= 18412 45597 & aid= 
ts- boost ed- pla& pid= 369& cid= 6513& adgro up= 10231 23727 15& netwo rk= g& device= c& gclid= CjwKC 
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on “all” with capital lettering.22 Verbally, politicians often place intonation on the 
word “all”.23 Finally, slogans for the ALM movement often include the beginning 
of an exhaustive list: e.g., “Black lives matter, White lives matter, all lives matter” 
(sometimes the list is indicated pictorially).24 All of these examples offer linguis-
tic support the claim that ALM activists are offering an answer to the wh-question 
Which lives matter? as opposed to Do Black lives matter?, or even Do all lives 
matter?
The sticking point, however, is that the context remains the same; it is one in 
which discourse participants verbally adopt the platitude that all lives matter, while 
readily participating in behaviours, structures, and institutions which constantly 
reinforce the idea that Black lives do not matter. There is a glaring inconsistency 
between the values affirmed in their speech versus the values affirmed in their 
participation in racist social structures. As Roberts (2012) notes, when audiences 
encounter this type of apparent inconsistency, they tend to interpret speakers in a 
way to make them consistent.25 In particular, they might do this by adjusting what 
they interpret to be the intended domain of the speaker’s utterance in a way that 
would make her words consistent. As Butler (2015) (echoing Mills, 1997) points 
out, the only way to make sense of the claim that “all lives matter” in a context in 
which it is treated as acceptable for Black people to be murdered on the streets is to 
assume that those who use this phrase do not include Black people in the domain of 
the discourse. That is, they do not think of Black lives as lives at all, or at least not 
lives that are relevant enough to be included in the statement “all lives matter”.26 
One purpose of the statement “Black lives matter” is to make this exclusion sali-
ent. That all lives matter, as Keeyanga-Yamahtta Taylor notes, “has always been an 
assumption. The entire point of Black lives matter is to illustrate the extent to which 
Black lives have not mattered in this country.”27 Moreover, as Butler (2015) notes, 
this exclusion must be brought to salience in order to demand and effect change: “To 
25 See Roberts (2012, p. 29).
26 Rand Paul, for instance, suggest that the slogan “Black lives matter” should be replaced with “Inno-
cent lives matter”, implicating that Black lives do not belong in the domain of “All lives matter” insofar 
as they are not innocent. https:// www. thegu ardian. com/ us- news/ 2015/ aug/ 27/ rand- paul- Black- lives- mat-
ter- name- change- all- innoc ent
27 Quoted in Victor (2016).
AjwjL D4BRA iEiwA g5NBF oxFqX bnT5B r329e vcqXN ol- jInII L3hPB IHAv1 m2NQA k0_ nFBCK GBoCR 
7IQAvD_ BwE& utm_ conte nt= 43688 33706 14, https:// dftees. com/ all- lives- matter- tee- shirts/.
Footnote 21 (continued)
22 https:// www. faceb ook. com/ Bring Peace ALM/? eid= ARCvY 7XQ6i xj2ce 90E2y l0bei iaFdT 1P1Is mBpJn 
0qy8E NesWI 61tIf k00wQ iBpkv XqS1r 7V_ L564R mL
23 https:// www. axios. com/ pence- Black- lives- matter- prote sts- 98d14 32d- 135c- 4707- abf4- ca5c6 c99ac e4. 
html, https:// www. youtu be. com/ watch?v= fk6eD KjQm4c, https:// www. cnn. com/ videos/ polit ics/ 2020/ 06/ 
17/ eric- swalw ell- matt- gaetz- Black- lives- matter- sot- keilar- nr- vpx. cnn.
24 https:// basif yshop. com/ produ ct/ all- lives- matter- blm- wlm- stopt hediv ision/? attri bute_ model=T- Shirt & 
attri bute_ color= Royal & attri bute_ size= S& utm_ campa ign= gs- 2019- 11- 08& utm_ source= googl e& utm_ 
medium= smart_ campa ign& gclid= CjwKC AjwjL D4BRA iEiwA g5NBF ivyJo eLvfP d2uex xNo_ j6GKt 
ZEIFq 7pLnH L6WG3 Px1qM 6EBXO spfxo CXb4Q AvD_ BwE, https:// www. etsy. com/ ie/ listi ng/ 52996 
7664/ all- lives- matter- t- shirt- all- lives, https:// thors hirts. com/ produ ct/ police- all- lives- matter- shirt/, https:// 
camae lshirt. com/ shirt/ all- lives- matter- eleph ant- vinta ge-t- shirt/.
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make that universal formula concrete, to make that into a living formulation, one 
that truly extends to all people, we have to foreground those lives that are not mat-
tering, to mark that exclusion and militate against it.”
It is unsurprising, then, that so many White Americans would be discomfited by 
the assertion that “Black lives matter”, given that it forces an examination of—and 
confrontation with—their own participation in the exclusion of Black lives from the 
easy platitudes they accept.28 Instead, they systematically redirect the discourse topic 
away from the central question of the value of Black lives by shifting the QUD from 
Do Black lives matter? to Which lives matter? This manipulation of the discourse 
context, I will argue in the next section, constitutes an act of epistemic justice.
5  QUD shifting as epistemic injustice
While I have questioned the assumption that linguistic exchange can be accurately 
modeled as a cooperative endeavor to gain information about the world, it is cer-
tainly the case that successful communication requires some level of cooperation 
and reciprocity from conversational participants. As part of a long philosophi-
cal tradition associated with the work of Paul Grice (1989), theorists of language 
have focused primarily on the way in which audiences depend on speakers to make 
their communicative intentions transparent. However, more recent work by linguis-
tic theorists including Langton (1993), Hornsby (1995), Fricker (2007), and Dotson 
(2011), building on the work of Austin (1962) and Black feminist theorists such as 
Lorde (2007) and Collins (2000), have highlighted ways in which speakers are also 
dependent on audiences for understanding and uptake.29 In this section I focus, in 
particular, on ways in which speakers depend on audiences to recognize and take up 
the QUD governing their assertions. I’ll show that failure to do can constitute epis-
temic injustice.30
Following Kidd et al. (2017), I’ll use the umbrella term epistemic injustice very 
broadly to refer to “those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowl-
edge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices.”31 As Ander-
son (2017) points out, there are two prominent ways that epistemic injustice is 
28 Of course, there are other reasons that this assertion makes many White people uncomfortable. As 
Halstead (2017) notes, for those who are used to mattering as a zero-sum game, the valuing of some lives 
involves the devaluing of others. In particular, under a White supremacist system, the value of White 
lives is predicated upon the devaluing of lives of people of color. Cf. Atkins (2019).
29 Following, Austin (1962), Dotson (2011), Kukla (2014), and Anderson (2017) also highlight ways in 
which the moving parts involved in successful communicative exchange include context in addition to 
speaker and audience; background circumstances must be such as to facilitate mutual understanding and 
communicative success.
30 According to Roberts (2012), implicit QUDs can be characterized as presuppositions. Thus, failure 
to recognize and take up a QUD that a speaker implicitly aims to answer with her assertion qualifies 
more generally as a failure of presupposition accommodation. Though the exploration of QUD-shifting 
through the particular framework of presupposition accommodation failure strikes me as an important 
and interesting project, I will not have the space to do explore it here.
31 Kidd et al. (2017, p. 1).
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manifested in linguistic exchange: the obscuring of what the speaker meant and the 
loss of ability of speakers to perform uttterances and be interpreted correctly. I will 
argue below that manipulation of the discourse context by way of QUD-shifting can 
result in both; in particular, by shifting the QUD from Do Black lives matter? to 
Which lives matter? ALM activists assign to BLM activists an implicature that they 
did not perform, and disincentivize further utterances of “Black lives matter”. I will 
also argue that this manner of QUD-shifting stems from what Dotson (2011) calls 
pernicious ignorance; i.e., ignorance that “follows from a predictable epistemic gap 
in cognitive resources”. As Dotson points out, the pernicious nature of such igno-
rance is not determined by the intentions of individuals, but rather the ways in which 
it contributes to harmful practices—in this case, the failure to recognize and change 
a racist social structure. Because Anderson (2017) has made similar observations 
about the “All lives matter” response, I want to note how my proposal below both 
aligns with, and diverges from his: we both argue that the “All lives matter” response 
constitutes an act of epistemic injustice [Anderson (2017) uses the term hermeneuti-
cal injustice] insofar as it obscures speakers’ intended meaning and impacts their 
ability to successfully perform future utterances. However, while Anderson focuses 
on the causal explanation for this injustice by invoking the ideology of color-blind-
ness, I focus on articulating one particular linguistic mechanism through which this 
injustice is enacted. I don’t see these proposals as being in conflict, but rather bring-
ing out different, but related aspects of a complex social issue.32 (E.g., the ideology 
of colorblindless is likely a partial explanation for the linguistic phenomenon that I 
aim to describe.)
As Anderson (2017) notes, one way in which audience members may fail to 
uphold their end of the cooperative enterprise involved in successful communication 
is to obscure the speaker’s intended meaning by making their speech act out to be 
something other than was intended. This failure of conversational reciprocity, which 
he calls illocutionary flipping, has received much attention in relation to sexual 
refusal; for instance, a paradigm case of illocutionary flipping is that of a woman’s 
utterance of “no” in response to a man’s sexual advances being interpreted by him 
as an act of consent rather than refusal.33 Similarly, when ALM activists assign the 
exclusive implicature Only Black lives matter to an utterance of “Black lives mat-
ter”, they misrepresent the speech act performed in such an utterance; they make it 
out to be an answer to the question Which lives matter? which gives a negative rul-
ing on non-Black lives, rather than an answer to Do Black lives matter? which gives 
32 My proposal concerning what is communicated by “Black lives matter” also differs from the proposal 
offered by Anderson (2017), who claims that the correct interpretation is what he calls the Inclusive 
reading—namely, that Black lives matter, too. This reading is better understood as an answer to Which 
lives matter? and concerns a topic which includes all the types of lives in the domain. In contrast, I am 
claiming that “Black lives matter” should be understood as answering Do Black lives matter? and con-
cerns only the topic of Black lives. In this sense I agree with Atkins (2019), who claims that Anderson’s 
(2017) interpretation is better understood as a repositioning—rather than a clarification—of “Black lives 
matter”.




a positive answer to a polar question whose topic concerns all and only Black lives. 
The mechanism by which this illocutionary flipping occurs is manipulation of the 
discourse context through shifting the QUD. The “All lives matter” response shifts 
the QUD from Do Black lives matter? to Which lives matter?, while presenting the 
discourse as if it had been governed by the latter all along; this allows ALM activists 
to assign the exclusive reading to utterances of “Black lives matter”—an implicature 
which could not have been derived under the intended QUD of those utterances, 
namely Do Black lives matter? This manipulation of the discourse serves to perpetu-
ate an oppressive status quo: it directs attention away from the topic of the value of 
Black lives, enabling discourse members to evade confrontation with ways in which 
they participate in behaviours, structures, and institutions which reinforce the idea 
that Black lives do not matter. It stirs up confusion and divisiveness by systemati-
cally distorting affirmations of the value of Black lives as expressions of threat to the 
value of the lives of others.
Moreover, this act of illocutionary flipping comes from a place of pernicious 
ignorance, and perpetuates the conditions of such ignorance; misidentification of the 
QUD governing utterances of “Black lives matter” are more likely to be made by 
those holding social positions in which they are unaffected by—or benefitted by—
the systematic devaluing of Black lives. It is more likely to be made by those hold-
ing social positions according to which they cannot make coherent sense of ques-
tions about the value of lives, when those questions are not centered on White lives. 
As Dotson (2011) points out, the culpability of such ignorance is beside the point. 
Its pernicious nature is due to the ways in which it contributes to a harmful practice, 
in this case the harmful practice of giving distorting interpretations of utterances of 
“Black lives matter”, which in turn serve to perpetuate an oppressive status quo.
Similarly, the “All lives matter” response disincentivizes future utterances of 
“Black lives matter” through what Dotson (2011) calls testimonial smothering. Dot-
son (2011) notes that testimonial smothering usually occurs under conditions of 
testimonial incompetence, and when the utterance is unsafe. The “All lives matter” 
response occurs under, and perpetuates both of these conditions: Testimonial incom-
petence, according to Dotson (2011), is “the failure of an audience to demonstrate 
to the speaker that they will find the proffered testimony accurately intelligible.34 In 
manipulating the discourse context by shifting the QUD from Do Black lives mat-
ter? to Which lives matter?, ALM activists both demonstrate their own testimonial 
incompetence and breed testimonial incompetence in others. As noted above, they 
demonstrate their own inability to find the proffered testimony accurately intelligibly 
by misrepresenting past utterances of “Black lives matter” as though they had been 
proffered as answers to a different QUD, and as though they had carried an exclusive 
implicature. In doing so, they render it more likely that future utterances will be 
distorted in the same manner—both by the fact that others may take their interpreta-
tion as authoritative, and by the fact that in uttering “All lives matter” they estab-
lish Which lives matter? as the new QUD. As we saw above, this is the only QUD 
under which the exclusive implicature could reasonably derived from utterances of 
34 Dotson (2011, p. 245).
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“Black lives matter”. Thus, establishing Which lives matter? as the new QUD places 
an additional burden on speakers who wish to utter “Black lives matter” as, in order 
to avoid misinterpretation, they will need to switch the QUD back to the original 
question in a context in which many discourse participants have demonstrated an 
active and committed refusal to accommodate it. In addition to creating conditions 
of testimonial incompetence, the “All lives matter” response renders future utter-
ances of “Black lives matter” unsafe. According to Dotson (2011), an utterance is 
unsafe in the case that it can easily lead to false beliefs about its intended message, 
causing social, political, and material harm. In the case that utterances of “Black 
lives matter” are misinterpreted according to the exclusive reading, such harm could 
be manifested in, e.g., disproportionate force against BLM protestors by governmen-
tal agencies, perpetuation of White silence in both in the public and private sphere, 
violence from White supremacist groups, etc.35 Finally, the smothering of utterances 
of “Black lives matter” is driven by, and perpetuates, the same pernicious ignorance 
involved in their misinterpretation.
Thus, the “All lives matter” response constitutes an act of epistemic injustice both 
insofar as it flips the illocutionary act performed by utterances of “Black lives mat-
ter” and disincentivizes future such utterances. Moreover, these acts of epistemic 
injustice are not individual, one-off failures of communicative reciprocity; they 
are systematic. The “All lives matter” response has become a symbol for a move-
ment aimed at undermining racial justice. It is a hashtag on social media, a slogan 
for counter protestors at BLM gatherings, a thin veil to throw over expressions of 
hypocrisy and hate. It keeps the topic of discourse on White lives, allowing those 
who benefit from White supremacy to continue to live in ignorance of the disconnect 
between their participation in this system and the superficial platitudes they accept.
6  Conclusion
I argued above that utterances of “Black lives matter” are proffered as answers 
to the QUD Do Black lives matter? which has been raised in a context where the 
value of Black lives is daily and systematically called into question. I argued that 
utterances of “All lives matter”, in contrast, are proffered as answers to a different 
QUD—namely, Which lives matter? I’ve appealed to linguistic research concerning 
patterns of correspondence between intonational focus and discourse QUD, and well 
as facts about the context of discourse in order to support these claims. If the forego-
ing is correct, the “All lives matter” response to “Black lives matter” shifts the QUD 
mid-discourse—a move which, I’ve argued, constitutes an act of epistemic injustice 
insofar as it obscures the intended meaning of utterances of “Black lives matter” 
and disincentivizes future such utterances, serving to systematically perpetuate an 
oppressive status quo. In conclusion, let me address a few potential worries for the 
foregoing arguments:
35 Ibid, p. 245.
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1. But not all QUD shifting is unjust!
 Absolutely. Almost any kind of misinterpretation—including that involved 
in QUD-shifting, can be completely innocuous. The ALM response is 
unjust because it perpetuates an oppressive social system, in the ways out-
lined above.
2. But the QUD-shifting in the ALM response may not be intentional!
 I agree, and would even conjecture that it is likely to be unintentional in 
most cases. Nonetheless, it is unjust. Like Dotson (2011), I take the issue 
of culpability to be irrelevant; it is unjust because it perpetuates harm, and 
not because of any particular speaker’s intentions.
3. But it’s not really epistemic!
 Let me remind the reader that I am using the term epistemic injustice in a 
broad, stipulative sense which is not limited to the epistemic, but includes 
“forms of unfair treatment that relate to… participation in communicative 
practices”. The objection, then, just amounts to the complaint that I am 
using the term as a misnomer—in which case the reader is free to substi-
tute their preferred terminology. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out 
the ALM response is intimately related to the epistemic in the following 
ways. First, interpretation is an epistemic phenomenon in the sense that to 
interpret someone is to form a belief about her conversational goals. The 
systematic misinterpretation of utterances of “Black lives matter” is thus 
an epistemic phenomenon. Moreover, this phenomenon is explained by 
epistemic states in the sense that the exclusive reading can only be reason-
ably attributed given ignorance of the state of racial violence in the U.S. 
Finally, the ALM response to this misinterpretation may affect epistemic 
states in the sense that it encourages further misinterpretations of utter-
ances of “Black lives matter”.36
4. But it’s obvious (and so unimportant)!
 Many may find it obvious that the “All lives matter” response involves 
changing the subject somehow, and that this changing-of-the-subject is 
morally problematic. So why are the foregoing arguments important, if 
they just tediously articulate what many find intuitively obvious? U s i n g 
theoretical tools to carefully articulate an inchoate—even if intuitively 
obvious—source of injustice is important because it serves to fill what 
Fricker (2007) calls a “hermeneutical lacuna”. It provides the resources 
to more deeply understand the phenomenon, to clearly explain it to others 
(especially those for whom it is not so obvious), to identify instances of 
36 I do not claim that each three of these features are always present in every “All lives matter” response. 




the same general type of phenomenon occurring in other contexts, and to 
mitigate against it.
This paper is both an instance of applied philosophy and of theoretical philosophy. It 
applies theoretical resources from linguistic and moral theory to analyze a particular 
social phenomenon, but it also identifies a broader mechanism of epistemic injus-
tice—namely, QUD-shifting—which has applications outside this phenomenon. 
Further explorations of the way this mechanism is used for purposes of epistemic 
injustice could include, for instance, contexts of domestic abuse in which the abuser 
gaslights the victim by shifting the QUD mid-discourse, thus misrepresenting her 
former speech acts and disincentivizing further utterances. Others may include crim-
inal justice contexts in which QUD-shifting distorts the discourse context in ways 
that misrepresent testimony and disincentivize victims/the unjustly accused from 
speaking out.
The social and political implications of the “All lives matter” response I’ve high-
lighted here are not new; it’s topic-shifting function is transparent to many, and theo-
rists and lay-people alike have outlined various ways in which this response serves 
as a tool for epistemic injustice. I hope to have contributed to this discussion by 
building upon on these insights and situating them within the framework of formal 
pragmatic theory. This serves both to more sharply delineating one particular mech-
anism behind the epistemic injustice of the “All lives matter” response—namely, 
manipulation of the discourse structure through QUD-shifting—and to provide the 
theoretical resources to identify other instances of epistemic injustice performed 
through the same mechanism. Finally, I hope to have shown the usefulness of formal 
pragmatic theory as a tool for making sense of political discourse, while also call-
ing into question some of its idealized assumptions about the cooperative nature of 
linguistic discourse.
Acknowledgements I’m especially thankful to Jess Isserow Michelle Liu and Richard Moore for helpful 
feedback on the ideas presented here. Thanks also to the audience at the University of Warwick Depart-
mental Colloquium where this paper was presented, and two anonymous referees from this journal. This 
project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program 
under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 845374.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen 
ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Anderson, L. (2017). Epistemic injustice and the philosophy of race. In J. Medina, I. J. Kidd, & G. Pohl-
haus Jr. (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of epistemic injustice. Routledge.
 Synthese
1 3
Atkins, A. (2019). Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter? Color-blindness and epistemic injustice*. 
Social Epistemology, 33(1), 1–22. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 02691 728. 2018. 14838 79.
Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Clarendon Press.
Beaver, D. I., & Clark, B. (2008). Sense and sensitivity: How focus determines meaning. Blackwell.
Benz, A., & Salfner, F. (2013). Discourse structuring questions and scalar implicatures. In Bezhanishvili, 
G., Löbner, S., Marra, V., & Richter, F. (Eds.), Logic, language, and computation. TbiLLC 2011. 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 7758). Springer.
Butler, J. (2015). What’s Wrong with ‘All Lives Matter’? The New York Times. https:// opini onator. blogs. 
nytim es. com/ 2015/ 01/ 12/ whats- wrong- with- all- lives- matter/. Accessed 3 July 2020.
Camp, E. (2018). Insinuation, common ground, and the conversational record. In D. Fogal, D. W. Harris, 
& M. Moss (Eds.), New work on speech acts. Oxford University Press.
Carlson, L. (1982). Dialogue games: An approach to discourse analysis (Synthese Language Library 17). 
D. Reidel.
Collins, P. H. (2000). Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empower-
ment. (2nd ed.). Routledge.
Dotson, K. (2011). Tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing. Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Grindrod, J., & Borg, E. (2019). Questions under discussion and the semantics/pragmatics divide. The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 69(275), 418–426.
Groenendijk, J., & Stokhof, M. (1984). On the semantics of questions and the pragmatics of answers. In 
F. Landman & F. Veltman (Eds.), Varieties of Formal Semantics (pp. 143–170). Dordrecht: Foris.
Halstead, J (2016). The Real Reason White People Say ’All Lives Matter’. Huffington Post. http:// www. 
huffi ngton post. com/ john–halst ead/ dear–fello w–White –peopl e–_b_ 11109 842. html. Accessed 3 July 
2020.
Halstead, J. (2017). The other reason White people say “All Lives Matter”. Huffington Post: https:// www. 
huffp ost. com/ entry/ the- other- reason- White- people- say- all- lives- matter_ b_ 595e4 349e4 b0cf3 c8e8d 
56a2. Accessed 3 July 2020.
Hornsby, J. (1995). Disempowered speech. Philosophical Topics, 23(2), 127–147
Hornsby, J. (1993). Speech acts and pornography. Women’s Philosophy Review, 10, 38–45.
Hornsby, J., & Langton, R. (1998). Free speech and illocution. Legal Theory, 4(1), 21–37.
Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., & Pohlhaus, G. (eds.) (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. 
Routledge.
Kukla, R. (2014). Performative Force, convention, and discursive injustice. Hypatia, 29(2), 440–457
Langton, R. (1993). Speech acts and unspeakable acts. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22(4), 293–330
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Harvard University Press.
Lorde, A. (2007). Sister outsider: Essays and speeches. Berkeley: Crossing Press.
Maitra, I. (2009). Silencing speech. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), 309–338.
Mcgowan, M. K. (2014). Sincerity silencing. Hypatia, 29(2), 458–473.
Mills, C. W. (1997). The racial contract. Cornell University Press.
Olasov, I. (2016). How Did “All Lives Matter” Come to Oppose “Black Lives Matter”? A Philosopher 
of Language Weighs In. Slate: http:// www. slate. com/ blogs/ lexic on_ valley/ 2016/ 07/ 18/ all_ lives_ 
matter_ versus_ Black_ lives_ matter_ how_ does_ the_ philo sophy_ of_ langu age. html. Accessed 3 July 
2020.
Roberts, C. (2012). Information structure: Towards an integrated formal theory of pragmatics. Semantics 
and Pragmatics, 5(6), 1–69.
Schoubye, A. J., & Stokke, A. (2016). What is Said? Noûs, 50(4), 759–793
Stalnaker R. (1978). Assertion. In P. Cole (ed.), Pragmatics (Syntax and Semantics 9) (pp. 315–332). 
Acade dren. An ’exactly two’ interpretation of the cardinal in answer A2 would thus make this 
answer overinformative with respect to the functional needs defined by the main question inferring 
from topics 402.
van Kuppevelt, J. (1996). Inferring from Topics: Implicatures as topic-dependent inferences. Linguistics 
and Philosophy, 19(4), 393–443
van Rooij, R., & Schulz, K. (2004). Exhaustive interpretation of complex sentences. Journal of Logic, 
Laguage and Information, 13(4), 491–519
Victor, D. (2016). Why ‘All lives matter’ is Such a Perilous Phrase. The New York Times. https:// www. 
nytim es. com/ 2016/ 07/ 16/ us/ all- lives- matter- black lives- matter. html.
1 3
Synthese 
Zondervan, A., Meroni, L., & Gualmini, A. (2008). Experiments on the role of the question under discus-
sion for ambiguity resolution and implicature computation in adults. In Proceedings of SALT 18.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
